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Bitcoin is a crypto-currency which differs in several ways 
from the traditional use of money. It does not require an 
individual name but digital wallet IDs, which makes it 
more private. Bitcoin technology currently lacks 
protection with respect to monetary transfers, and its 
structure is not endorsed by the governments. Yet, 
understanding the concept of trust is fundamental to 
Bitcoin technology and digital currency economy. This 
paper offers a review of relevant work on cryptocurrency 
and trust in HCI, and critically examines its value in 
understanding the issues of trust in Bitcoin technology. 
Several limitations of the current theories and models of 
trust are identified, and a research framework is proposed 
to explore the specific trust challenges raised by the 
Bitcoin technology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Issued in 2009 by an anonymous entity (Rogojnu and 
Badea, 2014), Bitcoin technology has become a leader in 
peer-to-peer crypto-currency (P2P foundation, 2015). It 
uses nodes of a peer-to-peer network with the purpose of 
keeping track of transactions, and cryptographic 
algorithms to provide core security functions (Bitcoin 
Wiki, 2011). In the Bitcoin network, money is not 
printed, but mined, through widely distributed computing 
power (Bradbury, 2013). Miners create Bitcoin in a 
controlled way by running dedicated programs. 
According to Kervick (2014), Bitcoin architecture differs 
significantly from prior electronic payment systems, and 
potentially lacks trust. Bitcoin technology operates 
through electronic transactions and poses interesting 
tensions regarding the issue of trust. On the one hand, its 
open source, decentralized architecture is open for 
scrutiny. On the other hand, Bitcoin operates under the 
premise of anonymity: although the transactions under 
each individual Bitcoin address are publicly archived, the 
identity of the owner of the address remains undisclosed. 
Transactions are considered anonymous because nothing 
ties individuals or organizations to the accounts that 
enable online transactions.  
While most of the academic work on trust in Bitcoin 
technology has taken place in cybersecurity and 
cryptography areas, a user-centered approach to the 
exploration of Bitcoin has been limited. We argue that a 
richer understanding of the issue of trust informed by 
Bitcoin users is important. This paper offers a review of 
relevant work on money and trust in HCI, and critically 
examines its value in understanding the issues of trust in 
Bitcoin technology. The main contribution of this paper is 
the development of research framework to explore the 
specific trust challenges raised by the Bitcoin technology. 
The following section offers a review of the main models 
of trust. Then we introduce our research framework, and 
apply it to identify the challenges around trust in Bitcoin 
technology. 
Trust and Digital Currency in HCI 
While trust has been a research area benefiting from long-
term HCI interest, the issue of digital currency has just 
starting to capture scholars’ attention. In a CHI 2014 
workshop focused on financial interactions and digital 
currency (Kaye, 2014), 12 position papers have focused 
on issues such as finance, commerce, financial literacy, 
money democracy, emotions and aesthetics.  
Ferreira et al. (2015) have explored user experience with 
Bristol Pound (£B), a local complementary currency used 
in Bristol, UK. Authors run a survey with about 200 users 
on how people conduct mobile phone transactions via 
SMS, their motivations and challenges for using this 
currency. Study findings highlighted the payment’s 
unpredictable and slow qualities and their value for 
strengthening social connections through ludic 
interactions, as well as increased mindfulness about their 
practice of purchase and consumption. This underlies the 
paradox of how a technology lacking trust, allows for 
strengthening the social trust between the actors involved 
in transactions, leading in turn to a more cohesive 
community. The study has also emphasized that Bitcoin 
technology may benefit from leveraging such face to face 
social connections in small communities to mitigate the 
challenges of slow, unreliable transactions. 
In a critique of alternative and complementary currency 
and exchange paradigms, Carroll and Bellotti (2015) have 
discussed four technological innovations: local 
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for 
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are 
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that 
copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights 
for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be 
honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or 
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior 
specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from 
Permissions@acm.org.  
 
OzCHI '15 , December 07 - 10 2015, Melbourne, VIC, Australia 




currencies, timebanks, cryptocurrencies, and 
microenterprises. In particular, they have highlighted the 
value of cryptocurrency like Bitcoin for individual’s 
privacy and control potentially subverting centralized 
governmental and financial institutions. Authors have 
placed this critique in the current global economic 
context, whose challenges may well benefit from such 
novel, money centered design and technologies, as a rich 
space for CSCW and HCI communities to engage with. 
With respect to trust, we start by introducing key models 
and properties. Trust has been described as the subjective 
belief in the character, ability, strength, reliability, honesty 
or truth of someone or something (Grandison and Sloman, 
2000). In their seminal model of mechanisms of trust, 
Riegelsberger et al. (2005) described trust warranting 
properties using the distinction between contextual and 
intrinsic properties. Their contextual properties consist of 
temporal, social and institutional embeddedness which are 
more relevant in the first interaction, while the intrinsic 
properties of the trustee such as ability, norm-compliance 
and benevolence become increasingly relevant as trust 
matures through continual exchanges. The multifaceted 
concept of trust has been explored across a large range of 
interactive systems, and consistent findings have shown the 
distinction between technological, social, and institutional 
trust (Misiolek, 2002; Lippert and Swiecrz, 2005; 
Leppanen, 2010).  
Technological Trust 
The technological dimension of trust consists of 
individual perceptions and assessments of technology-
related trust issues (Leppanen, 2010). The technological 
trust can be better understood in the light of its three 
attributes: advantage to use, expectation of technology 
usability, and perception of user’s skills. The advantage 
to use refers to the needs for implementing a 
technological system that will increase task performance 
(Goodhue et al. 2006).  
Expectation of technology usability has been defined by 
Davis (1986) in terms of user’s initial presumption on 
what using the technology will be like. Usability can also 
be seen as a set of objectives and guidelines for system 
designers and software developers to create devices and 
applications that take minimal effort for the users to use. 
For example, Nielsen (2000) proposed guidelines for 
enhancing individual trust in website by assessing 
usability in contrast to the risk of making online 
transactions. Perception of user skills capture individual’s 
perception of his or her capabilities and motivations to 
use a computer or a technological system (Nielsan, 2000).  
Social trust 
Social trust has been defined as the feeling of the good 
disposition of the other (Castelfranchi and Falcone, 
2001). Leppanen (2010) also identified four key concepts 
of trust including disposition to trust, perceived 
trustworthiness, situational factors, and shared attributes 
which we further outline. Disposition to trust depicts the 
trustor’s own willingness to be dependent on others, 
further determined by a trusting stance and faith in 
humanity (McKnight et al., 1998). It has been argued that 
the disposition to this goodwill arises from positive trust-
concerning exchanges with people, which lead to a 
positive general belief on the mankind. Boon & Holmes 
(1991) also discuss how individual’s disposition towards 
trust sets the expectations for trustworthiness in general. 
Hence, personal, first-hand positive experience towards a 
new context is paramount in building up the disposition 
to trust.  Perceived trustworthiness has been defined as 
the expectation that another party will perform a 
particular action (Mayer et al. 1995; Rousseau et al., 
1998). This is an important concept which relies on 
distinct categories of beliefs such as benevolence, 
competence, honesty and predictability (McKnight et al., 
1998). Situational factors are those targeting the context 
of the organization (McKnight et al., 1998). Moorman 
(1993) and Purser (2001) argued for the importance of the 
situation where trust formation takes place. Sharing 
attributes with the trusting partner is crucial in building 
trusted relationship (Hupcey et al., 2001). These include 
the importance of positive past exchanges that has been 
emphasized in Boon and Holmes’s model (1991) 
describing the continuous nature of the shared experience. 
According to this model, both short- and long-term 
exchanges can benefit from shared attributes of trust. 
Institutional Trust 
Institutional trust is defined as the party being initially 
willingly vulnerable to the counterpart’s action (Mayer et 
al., 1995). It can be described through power relations, 
and organizational structure. Power relation becomes 
important for trustworthiness in social relationship where 
an individual has a position of power for decision making 
in an organization (Tyler and Degoey, 1996). Trust in 
organizational structure reflects the importance of 
hierarchical relationships across the organization 
(Kramer, 1996). In McKnight’s (1998) trust model, the 
organizational trust is explained through the system of 
rules and regulations governing each activity in the 
organization. There have also been attempts to 
conceptualize trust in decentralized systems. For 
example, Gutscher’s (2007) trust model integrates public 
key authenticity verification to evaluate arbitrary trust 
structures which allow multiple keys per user. It also 
enables the signer of trust certificate to limit the length of 
the trust chains and to define the semantic of trust. This 
trust model consists of four building blocks. Two basic 
blocks define the existing trust and authentication 
relations together with inference rules for combining 
them. The other two blocks describe representations of 
trust values and how to compute them for trust relations. 
Blaze et al. (1996) address the issue of decentralized trust 
management through four principles such as unified 
mechanism, flexibility, locality of control, and separation 
of mechanism and policy. The unified mechanism holds 
the policies, credentials and relationships for network 
application security, while the complex trust relationship 
falls under the flexibility principle. Locality of control 
supports the trust of relationship across the community, 
while the separation of mechanism policy supports 
control of the verifying credentials of the applications. 
The trust concepts, models and principles described 
above either fail to address trust in decentralization 
 3 
systems or address it from the sole perspective of users of 
such systems. Bitcoin is not only a decentralized system 
but a grassroots driven technology involving multiple 
stakeholders. Thus, it offers a unique perspective to 
explore the development of trust within and across these 
stakeholders, together with its most challenging and 
promising issues. A deep understanding of these trust 
issues in Bitcoin technology may in turn challenge some 

















Figure 1: Research Framework for Exploring Levels of Trust in Bitcoin Technology (left) and  
across Stakeholders Groups (right) 
 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK  
We now propose a research framework (Figure 1) which 
integrates key aspects of trust from HCI literature, with 
the main challenges posed by Bitcoin technology, to 
ensure the exploration of trust across all the Bitcoin 
stakeholders. The framework places Bitcoin technology at 
its center, and highlights how different stakeholders are 
involved in shaping the three different levels of trust. We 
define technological trust as people’s trust in Bitcoin 
technology experienced before, during, and after 
engaging in online transactions. This could include users’ 
trust that their Bitcoin account is secured and cannot be 
hacked, or payees’ trust that the transfer is authorized. 
Social trust is the trust that Bitcoin stakeholders develop 
between each other.  This trust is enlisted for each type of 
exchange occurring across (and within) different categories 
of stakeholders. For example transactions involving 
purchase of goods enlist trust between users and 
merchants. Upon completion, these transactions require 
miners’ authorization, so both users and merchants need to 
trust the miners for completing their job. At the same time, 
selfish miners can raise issues of trust among miners (Eyal 
and Sirer, 2014).  Social trust between users/merchants and 
exchangers can be also problematic
1
. We argue that 
because of its decentralized nature, the classic definition of 
institutional trust does not apply to Bitcoin. However, there 
is a higher authoring to which Bitcoin technology is 
requested to be accountable, namely governmental 
institutions. We define institutional trust, the trust of 
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governmental institutions in Bitcoin technology. The main 
issues here relate to money laundry and deflation. 
Applying the Framework to Identify Trust Challenges  
We now explore how the framework can be applied to 
identify important trust issues which deserve stronger 
HCI engagement. We should note that there is limited 
empirical work exploring the experience of using Bitcoin 
and the issues of trust surrounding it. First we start by 
describing the Bitcoin stakeholders, grouped by 
Shcherbak (2014) in four categories: users, miners, 
exchanges and merchants. Users are people who use 
Bitcoin to buy goods and services from Bitcoin 
merchants. Merchants are businesses which accept 
Bitcoins as medium of exchange for goods and services 
and are connected to the Bitcoin network. Exchanges are 
the providers of online trading platforms where the 
registered members can exchange their Bitcoins for 
traditional currency and vice versa. Miners are those 
Bitcoin stakeholders who can record transactions (and 
collect reward) after they successfully solved crypto-
puzzles (Eyal and Sirer, 2014). 
Users’ Trust in Bitcoin   
One specific challenge pertaining to users is their limited 
knowledge of how Bitcoin technology works and how 
they need to protect their bitcoins. Keeping bitcoins on 
one’s computer involves security risks similar to keeping 
large sums of cash in one’s physical wallet (Bitcoin Wiki, 
2011). Although Bitcoin is decentralized and at large has 
no single point of failure, it is nevertheless susceptible to 
a form of denial of service (Quora Forum, 2011) or 
double-spending attack (Karame, 2012).  
Merchants’ Trust in Bitcoin 
Merchants’ trust is challenged by their limited knowledge 
about buyers, and whether their payment will be received 












ability to track reliable buyers with whom they have 
previously engaged in positive transactions.  
Impact of Miners’ and Exchanges’ on Bitcoin Social Trust 
We know little about the trust challenges faced by these 
stakeholders. However, exchanges are crucial in 
supporting users’ and merchants’ trust, and at large the 
social trust within Bitcoin system. For example, 
exchanges have no audit process and no verification 
procedures (Bitcoin Forum, 2010). Equally, although 
each transaction should be digitally signed and secure 
after being verified by an unknown miner, we know little 
about mechanisms trailing miners’ competence and 
integrity. Recent work has shown that the reward 
structure which incentivize miners to contribute to the 
system and its decentralized nature, can motivate some 
miners to circumvent the Bitcoin protocol and mine 
selfishly at the cost of honest miners (Eyal and Sirer, 
2014). This suggests that issues of trust can also develop 
within the same stakeholder category. 
Governments’ Trust in Bitcoin 
Bitcoin is a protocol promoted as the first peer-to-peer 
institution, offering alternative to central banks 
(Abramowitz, 2014). It has been argued that the demand 
for peer-to-peer transactions can be an indication for the 
development of trust in Bitcoin (Bitcoin.org, 2014). In 
this context is useful revisiting the main components of 
peer-to-peer governance- as a mechanism for institutional 
trust in Bitcoin: arbitration, trust, bank, business 
association and public law. For example, peer-to-peer 
protocols can offer structure through a set of rules for 
controlling the Bitcoin technology. Peer-to-peer protocol 
can also be used as a by governments to develop a 
structured legal framework for Bitcoin technology. In 
peer-to-peer decision making, arbitration is one way to 
resolve disputes (Thornburg, 2012). If peer-to-peer 
arbitration is able to serve decisions, then it could also 
serve as the foundation for peer-to-peer trust. It would be 
beneficial for trustee to be able to invest deposited 
bitcoins to grow their trust corpus (Abramowitz, 2014). 
However the challenge in crypto currency is there is no 
mechanism allowing such accounts to own virtual assets. 
In order to own the assets, there is a need of an 
intermediary link between virtual and the real world. 
Indeed a crypto currency bank may able to establish this 
connection. If the peer-to-peer bank is able to accept bank 
funds, make investment decisions, and approve 
expenditures, then peer-to-peer decision making can be 
used to operate the peer-to-peer business association 
(Abramowitz, 2014). A significant obstacles to private 
peer-to-peer institutions, is government hostility 
(Abramowitz, 2014). Despite lacking trust, peer-to-peer 
systems can yet produce decisions with a high degree of 
consensus. This limited form of decision-making inherent 
in Bitcoin technology could serve as a foundation for 
more sophisticated types of decision-making 
mechanisms, allowing legal institutions to be created 
without the designation of a central authority.  
REFLECTION 
We now reflect on the value of this framework for shaping 
future HCI research agendas. We have shown that the 
challenges to trust are pervasive affecting all Bitcoin 
stakeholders, albeit in different ways. They are also 
interdependent, as distinct user groups may have conflicted 
goals. Not at least, some trust challenges are hidden, i.e., 
miners’ activity is seldom open for scrutiny. We argue that 
a user-centered approach to the exploration of trust can 
shed light into the challenges experienced by people using 
Bitcoin. This is radically different than the current 
algorithmic approach to trust in Bitcoin. Research 
supported by our framework can also open up novel design 
opportunities to address the identified challenges and 
support trust. For example, one can imagine new class of 
interactive technologies where trust is captured, 
materialized and gained or lost through exchanges. This 
new design space for decentralized interactive crypto-
currency technologies may not only support better adoption 
of Bitcoin technology but also the digital currency 
economy at large.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper introduces a HCI research framework arguing for 
the importance of exploring trust in Bitcoin technology. The 
framework builds on theoretical perspectives on trust and 
discriminates between technological, social and institutional 
trust, mapped against the four identified Bitcoin 
stakeholders: users, miners, exchanges and merchants. We 
have used the framework as a lens for identifying the issues 
of Bitcoin trust, and shown that they are pervasive, hidden 
and interdependent. The value of this the framework for HCI 
research agendas has been also discussed. 
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